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Prosser states, "As to defendants other than sellers, who supply
chattels under contract, there has as yet been no suggestion of any
strict liability to third persons."4 But considering that the law
has expanded from liability for negligence where there is no privity" to strict liability in real estate4 ' notwithstanding the doctrine
of caveat emptor, the day may come when strict liability without
privity will be applied to defendants other than sellers. 6
THOMAS SIDNEY SMITH

Torts-Nondelegable Duty-Direct and Vicarious Liability
for Negligence
The plaintiff in a recent North Carolina case1 recovered from
the general concessionaire2 of a county fair for injuries received
when she was thrown from a carnival ride owned and operated by
an independent contractor. The retaining bar of the ride was found
to be difficult to close, and the independent contractor, not a defendant in the suit, was found to be negligent in failing to ascertain
whether the retaining bar securing the plaintiff was closed and
properly latched. The ride was determined to be "inherently dangerous,"'3 i.e., that it was such a ride as was likely to cause injury
to passengers unless due care was exercised in its maintenance and
operation. The jury also found the defendant concessionaire negligent in failing to inspect the ride and its operation to see that it
was maintained and operated with due care.
It is the general rule that an employer is not ordinarily liable
for the negligent acts of his independent contractor; however this
rule has numerous exceptions.' They are so numerous, in fact, that
" Id. § 98, at 685.
" MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
" 44 N.J. at -, 207 A.2d at 328.
" It must be noted that the Supreme Court of New Jersey held the defendant liable on the alternate grounds of negligence and implied warranty
of habitability. The alternate holding of negligence may tend to minimize
the import of the court's decision on implied warranty. Whether the court

will follow this case as a precedent, where no negligence is alleged, remains to be seen.
'Dockery v. World of Mirth Shows, Inc., 264 N.C. 406, 142 S.E.2d
29 (1965).
'Hereinafter the terms concessionaire, employer, or owner will be
used to designate the person who contracts with the independent contractor.
'264 N.C. at 414, 142 S.E.2d at 35.
'2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 26.11 (1956); MECHEM, AGENCY §§ 480-

90 (4th ed. 1952);
OND),

PROSSER, TORTS

TORTS §§ 409-29 (1965).

§ 70 (3d ed. 1964);

RESTATEMENT (SEc-
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their very number casts doubt upon the validity of the rule.5 Commentators group the exceptions under three broad categories:"
(1) personal fault of the employer, (2) nondelegable duty of the
employer, and (3) inherently dangerous or dangerous in the absence of special precautions.7
Cases comprising the first category are not genuine exceptions
to the general rule because the employer is liable for his own
failure' to exercise due care, not for the failure of an independent
contractor. Such situations arise where he negligently selects an
incompetent contractor, 9 provides defective equipment,'0 or negligently gives instructions pursuant to the work to be done." A
negligent failure to exercise control retained 12by him over the work
will result in direct liability of the employer.
The second category is comprised of those cases in which statutory duties,' 3 duties created by charter or franchise,14 or common
"A number of factors concur to constitute ....such a powerful argument for the liability of the employer of an independent contractor that it
would seem highly desirable for the courts to adopt the rule of liability and
confine nonliability to a few exceptional cases." HARPER, TORTS § 292, at
646 (1933). See Morris, The Torts of an Independent Contractor, 29 ILL.
L. REV. 339 (1935). But see Steffen, The Independent Contractor and the
Good Life, 2 U. Ci. L. REV. 501 (1935).
' See authorities cited note 4 supra.
'These terms represent different forms of stating the same general
principle. See Annot., 23 A.L.R. 1016 (1923); Annot., 23 A.L.R. 1084
(1923); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS §§ 416, 427 (1965).
' See HARPER, TORTS § 292, at 645 (1933). "In the cases in this category
the employer's liability is clearly not vicarious but based on pure tort
theory.. . ." MECHEm, AGENCY, § 482, at 332 (1952).
'See Huntt v. McNamee, 141 Fed. 293 (4th Cir. 1905) (applying North
Carolina law) ; Baker v. Scott County Milling Co., 323 Mo. 1089, 20 S.W.2d
494 (1929); Mullich v. Brocker, 119 Mo. App. 332, 97 S.W. 549 (1905);
Jolly Motor Livery Corp. v. Allenberg, 188 Tenn. 452, 221 S.W.2d 513

(1949);

RESTATEMENT (SECOND),

TORTS §

411 (1965).

"See, e.g., Brady v. Jay, 111 La. 1071, 36 So. 132 (1904); Johnson v.
J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 193 Mo. App. 198, 182 S.W. 1089 (1916).
Compare Mack v. Marshall Field & Co., 218 N.C. 697, 12 S.E.2d 235
(1940); Peters v. Carolina Cotton & Woolen Mills, Inc., 199 N.C. 753,
155 S.E. 867 (1930); Paderick v. Goldsboro Lumber Co., 190 N.C. 308,
130 S.E. 29 (1925); Royal v. Dodd, 177 N.C. 206, 98 S.E. 599 (1919);
Midgette v. Branning Mfg. Co., 150 N.C. 333, 64 S.E. 5 (1909).
App. 754 (1913);
"- See Starr v. Standard-Tilton Milling Co., 183 Ill.
Board of County Comm'rs v. Vickers, 62 Kan. 25, 61 Pac. 391 (1900);
State Highway & Pub. Works Comm'n v. Diamond Transp. Corp., 226
N.C. 371, 38 S.E.2d 214 (1946); Embler v. Gloucester Lumber Co., 167
N.C. 457, 83 S.E. 740 (1914) (dictum); Persons v. Raven, 187 Ore. 1,

207 P.2d 1051 (1949).

"2Bissel v. Ford, 176 Mich. 64, 141 N.W. 860 (1913); Allen v. Texas

866 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
Elec." E.g.,
Serv. Snyder
Co., 350v.S.W.2d
Southern Cal. Edison Co., 44 Cal. 2d 793, 285 P.2d
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duties, 15

i.e., duties that exist because of some special relationlaw
ship between the employer and the plaintiff and those that exist
because of the inherently dangerous character of the work, place the
employer under a nondelegable duty. As in the first category,
the employer may be liable for his own fault in these situations.
Where it is reasonably foreseeable that harmful consequences will
arise unless special precautions are taken, the employer may be
subject to liability for his failure to inspect the work after it is
finished1 to see that it is in reasonably safe condition, or, on occasion,
to see that proper precautions are taken on work in progress.' 7
Where activities being carried on by an independent contractor on
the employer's premises create unreasonable risks of bodily harm
to those outside the premises, the employer may subject himself
to liability for failure to exercise reasonable care to protect them.' s
Owners and occupiers of land who hire independent contractors to
do work on their premises owe business invitees the common law
duty of keeping their premises reasonably safe for the purposes of
the visit."
912 (1955); Weber v. Buffalo Ry., 20 App. Div. 292, 47 N.Y. Supp. 7
(1897); Blount v. Tow Fong, 48 R.I. 453, 138 Atl. 52 (1927).
"E.g., Dixie Stage Lines v. Anderson, 222 Ala. 673, 134 So. 23 (1931);
Eli v. Murphy, 39 Cal. 2d 598, 248 P.2d 756 (1952); Brown v. L.H.
Bottoms Truck Lines, Inc., 227 N.C. 299, 42 S.E.2d 71 (1947); Newsome
v. Suratt, 237 N.C. 297, 74 S.E.2d 732 (1953), noted in Agency, 1953 Survey
of N.C.
Law, 32 N.C.L. Rav. 379, 385 (1954).
"0E.g., Ferguson v. Ashkenazy, 307 Mass. 197, 29 N.E.2d 829 (1940)
(landlord-tenant relationship and inherently dangerous activity); Corrigan
v. Elsinger, 81 Minn. 42, 83 N.W. 492 (1900) (business invitee); Davis v.
Summerfield, 133 N.C. 325, 45 S.E. 654 (1903) (adjacent property owners
and inherently dangerous activity).
"0McGuire v. Hartford Buick Co., 131 Conn. 417, 40 A.2d 269 (1944)
(seller of used automobile failed to inspect tires negligently repaired by
contractor); Rumetsch v. John Wanamaker, New York, Inc., 216 N.Y.
379, 110 N.E. 760 (1915) (corporate owner of department store failed to
have elevator properly inspected). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), ToRTs § 412

(1965).

7 fSheridan v. Rosenthal, 206 App. Div. 279, 201 N.Y. Supp. 168 (1923)
(supervision of construction required). See Person v. Cauldwell-Wingate
Co., 176 F.2d 237, 240 (2d Cir. 1949), "In such [inherently dangerous]
cases the law imposes the duty of inspection upon the owner or contractor
in invitum, and forbids him to delegate it.. .. "
" E.g., Brown v. Gustafson, 264 Minn. 126, 117 N.W.2d 763 (1962);
Lamb v. South Unit Jehovah's Witnesses, 232 Minn. 259, 45 N.W.2d
403 (1950); Hunter v. Southern Ry., 152 N.C. 682, 68 S.E. 237 (1910);
Schwarts v. Merola Bros. Constr. Corp., 290 N.Y. 145, 48 N.E.2d 299
(1943), affirming 263 App. Div. 631, 34 N.Y.S.2d 220, motion denied,
289 0N.Y. 756, 46 N.E.2d 357.
" E.g., Turgeon v. Connecticut Co., 84 Conn. 538, 80 AtI. 714 (1911),
It was the duty of the defendent to use reasonable care to keep every
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The first genuine exceptions to the general rule of employer
nonliability fall within this category of nondelegable duty.2'0 These
cases proceed on the theory that the employer is vicariously liable2
for the independent contractor's acts of negligence that are not so
remote from the contemplated risks as to be collateral.' Thus
there is a nondelegable common-law duty to afford one's neighbor
lateral support, for landlords to maintain common approaches in
reasonably safe condition,' for adjacent owners to refrain from
obstructing the public way,25 and to maintain one's premises in a
reasonably safe condition for business invitees.2 8 In effect, the negpart of the grounds to which it had invited the plaintiff in a reasonably
safe condition, and to accomplish this end it was its duty to use reasonable care to see that the railway was so built, maintained, and operated
as not to risk doing injury to any of its patrons while in the park.
Id. at 542, 80 Atl. at 715; Stickel v. Riverview Sharpshooters' Park Co.,
250 Ill. 452, 95 N.E. 445 (1911); Thornton v. Main State Agricultural
Soc'y, 97 Me. 108, 53 Atl. 979 (1902) ; Williams v. Charles Stores, Co., 209
N.C. 591, 184 S.E. 496 (1936); Smith v. Cumberland County Agricultural
Soc'y, 163 N.C. 346, 79 S.E. 632 (1913) (dictum); E.S. Billington Lumber
Co. v. Newport, 180 Okla. 407 (1937); Engstrom v. Huntley, 345 Pa..10,
26 A.2d 461 (1942); Lineaweaver v. John Wanamaker of Philadelphia, 299
Pa. 2045,
149 Atl. 91 (1930).
HAPmR, TORTS § 292, at 647 (1933).

See Brown, Liability for the Torts of Independent Contractors in
West Virginia,55 W. VA. L. REv. 216 (1953); Comment, 44 CALIF. L. Rnv.
762 (1956); Comment, 39 YALE L.J. 861 (1930). See also Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk, 38 YALE L.J. 584, 720 (1929);
Morris, The Torts of an Independent Contractor,29 ILl. L. Rnv. 339 (193).
"See 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 26.11, at 1410 (1956); PROSSER,
TORTS

§ 70, at 487 (3d ed. 1964);

RESTATEMENT (SECOND),

TORTS

§ 426

(1965); Smith, Collateral Negligence, 25 MINN. L. REv. 399 (1941).
"E.g., Law v. Phillips, 136 W.Va. 761, 68 S.E.2d 452 (1952), 133
A.L.R.2d 95. In Davis v. Summerfield, 133 N.C. 325, 45 S.E. 654 (1903),
the defendant-employer did the actual excavation that damaged plaintiff's
building, but for the purpose of deciding whether an employer would be
liable for the negligence of his independent contractor, the court assumed
that the contractor performed the work. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
TORTS § 422A (1965).
"Brown v. George Pepperdine Foundation, 23 Cal. 2d 256, 143 P.2d
929 (1943) (negligence of contractor imputed to the landlord); Russo v.
Watson, 249 App. Div. 782, 292 N.Y. Supp. 249 (1936). See Annot., 162
A.L.R. 1111 (1946); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 421 (1965).
" E.g., Goodwin v. Mason & Seabury, 173 Iowa 546, 155 N.W. 966
(1916); Cole v. City of Durham, 176 N.C. 289, 97 S.E. 33 (1918);
Dunlap v. Raleigh, C. & S. R.R., 167 N.C. 669, 83 S.E. 703 (1914) ; McClure
v. Neuman, 17 Ohio Op. 2d 483, 178 N.E.2d 621 (1961). See Carrick v.
Southern Power Co., 157 N.C. 378, 72 S.E. 1065 (1911); Baily v. City of
Winston, 157 N.C. 252, 72 S.E. 966 (1911).
"Daly v. Bergstedt, 267 Minn. 244, 126 N.W.2d 242 (1964) ; Corrigan
v. Elsinger, 81 Minn. 42, 83 N.W. 492 (1900); Mayer v. Fairlawn Jewish
Center, 38 N.J. 549, 186 A.2d 274 (1962) (concurrent negligence of the
employer and the independent contractor),
Under the circumstances of this case [invitee], Center [the employer]
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ligence of the independent contractor provides the plaintiff with a

theory of recovery additional to or alternative with that of the
personal fault of the employer.
Cases where the activity is inherently dangerous comprise the
third category.2" To bring a case within this category, it is sufficient if there is an appreciable and foreseeable danger in relation
to the particular circumstances.29 Cases in which the employer
would be absolutely liable, without fault, are included within this
s
category. o

Since courts often state the personal fault and the inherently
dangerous cases in terms of nondelegable duty,"' the question arises
whether the grouping into categories is not more verbal than real.
The term "nondelegable duty" essentially expresses the underlying
concept of all the so-called exceptions to the general rule of em2
ployer immunity for the negligence of his independent contractor.
had a non-delegable duty for the safety of persons using the premises
at its invitation. If while repairs or structural alterations were going on,
a dangerous condition was created which resulted in injury to an invitee,
liability for damages would exist. And with respect to that liability
it would be immaterial whether the construction work was being performed by Center's own employees or by an independent contractor.
Id. at 555, 186 A.2d at 277; Eide v. Skerbeck, 242 Wis. 474, 8 N.W.2d 282
(1943) (tent peg too far out in midway of fair),
Wherever an owner or operator of a place of amusement leaves to an
independent contractor the performance of a duty which under the law
he is obligated to perform himself, he is liable for the negligent-act of a
servant of the independent contractor to the same extent as if the negligent act had been done by a servant directly in his employ.
Id. at 481-82, 8 N.W.2d at 285. Justice Ruffin in a dissent to the early
case of Wiswall v. Brinson, 32 N.C. 554, 564-79 (1849), stated the rules
with respect to the liability of an owner or occupier of land for dangerous
conditions on their premises, whether the work was done by a servant,
himself, or an independent contractor.
27 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS, Introductory note, § 409 (1965).
28 See 2 HARPER
& JAMES, TORTS § 26.11, at 1408 (1956); MECHEM,
AGENCY, §§ 487-90 (4th ed. 1952); PROSSER, TORTS § 70, at 484 (3d ed.
1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS §§ 416, 427 (1965).
s' Evans v. Elliott, 220 N.C. 253, 17 S.E.2d 125 (1941).
"The case of Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868), the building
stone for absolute liability for abnormally dangerous instrumentalities and
activities, was itself a case involving an independent contractor. See Allied
Hotels, Ltd. v. Barden, 389 P.2d 968 (Okla. 1964) (diversion of surface
water); Guilford Realty & Insurance Co. v. Blythe Bros. Co., 260 N.C. 69,
131 S.E.2d 900 (1963) (blasting). See generally PROSSER, TORTS §§ 74-79
(3d ed. 1964).
"See Annot., 23 A.L.R. 1084 (1923); Annot., 23 A.L.R. 1016 (1923);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
TORTS §§ 416, 427 (1965); 2 HARPER & JAMES,
TORTS § 26.11, at 1408 (1956).
'Apparently, this is the rationalization used by the North Carolina
court. See Evans v. Elliott, 220 N.C. 253, 17 S.E.2d 125 (1941); Thomas
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Included within this term would be all the categories enumerated
above, including those previously termed inherently dangerous and
personal fault. The essential idea is that these are situations in
3
which an employer may not contract away his liability."
4 would support both direct and vicarious
The facts in Dockery"
liability. The employer breached his nondelegable duty to inspect
and supervise operation of the ride. Negligence of the independent
contractor in operating the inherently dangerous ride could have
been imputed to the defendant. Nevertheless, the court chose to
express the employer's liability in terms of a breach of his own
duty.
A question is thus raised whether the court recognizes the independent contractor's negligence as a basis of employer liability in
addition to that predicated on the personal fault of the employer.
In addition to Dockery, another important North Carolina case
deals with this question.3 5
In Evans v. Elliott,3 6 the court stated that the employer's liability

was direct, original, and independent, not derivative.3 It further
stated that "the contractor may, of course, be liable for the same
want of due care in not taking the necessary precautions, for the
omission of which the employer becomes liable."' In Dockery, 0
the court stated that the
liability of such owner or general concessionaire is based either
upon his nondelegable duty to maintain a reasonably safe place
for the patrons, in accord with which he must answer for the
negligence of the sub-concessionaire... in rendering the premises
and devices unsafe, or merely upon the general ground that
such owner or general concessionaire is responsible for his
breach of duty to keep the premises, including the devices,
to any separate act or omisreasonably safe, without reference
sion of the sub-concessionaire.4 0
v. Hammer Lumber Co., 153 N.C. 351, 69 S.E. 275 (1910); Davis v.
Summerfield, 133 N.C. 325, 45 S.E. 654 (1903).
" Prosser states that, "these exceptions making the employer liable
overlap and shade into one another; and cases are comparatively rare in
which at least two of them do not appear." PROSSER, TORTS § 70, at 481
(1965).
8'264 N.C. 406, 142 S.E.2d 29 (1965).
" Evans v. Elliott, 220 N.C. 253, 17 S.E.2d 125 (1941).

3"Ibid.

'Id. at 259, 261, 17 S.E.2d at 129, 130.
"'ld. at 259, 17 S.E.2d at 129. (Emphasis added.)
8264 N.C. 406, 142 S.E.2d 29 (1965).
added.)

,oId. at 411, 142 S.E.2d at 33. (Emphasis
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It is therefore clear that an employer in North Carolina may be
vicariously liable for the negligence of his independent contractor.
As a practical matter, this means that the plaintiff in an action
against the employer has at least two, possibly three, theories of
recovery. He may formulate the issue with respect to the personal
fault of the employer and have the jury instructed accordingly. 4
In addition, the plaintiff may plead, offer proof, and have the jury
instructed on the negligence of the independent contractor that may
be imputed to the employer.4 When the activity contracted for is
"In Dockery, the following portion of the judge's instructions with
respect to the negligence of the defendant certainly opens to question whether
the jury was actually instructed on his personal fault: "[A]nd such failure
by... [the independent contractor] would be attributed as a matter of law
to ... the defendant, and that such failure of World of Mirth to inspect and
supervise was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries .... " Id. at 411, 142
S.E.2d at 33. The first portion of the instruction, beginning with the word
"and" and ending at the word "defendant," has no antecedent in the instr'iction. For further comment on this part of the instruction see note 42
infra. The latter portion of the instruction fails to submit the personal
negligence of the defendant to the jury, but is tantamount to a directive by
the judge to find the defendant liable. It is submitted that it was not the
intention of the court to impose absolute liability on the operators of
amusement rides.
An interesting point is raised in RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), TORTS § 416,
Illustration 3f (1965). Essentially the rule is that when the work is dangerous in the absence of special precautions (or inherently dangerous) and
the independent contractor exercises reasonable care but the harm happens
anyway, that the employer will not be liable merely because the precautions
taken by the contractor proved to be ineffectual. "In order that the employer
be subject to liability, it is necessary that the contractor fail to exercise
reasonable care to take adequate precautions."
It is submitted that, logically, this rule should apply to all cases where
the employer is under a nondelegable duty and the independent contractor
exercises reasonable care with harm resulting, this being true whether or
not the employer actually supervised or inspected the operations of the
independent contractor. However, the employer may be subject to liability
within those exceptions set out in notes 14, 15, 16, and 17 supra, dealing
with personal fault of the employer.
" In Dockery, the independent contractor's negligence was the first
issue submitted to the jury. Logically, this is the missing antecedent referred to in note 41 supra. If this is a correct interpretation, then it is reasonable to say that the employer was held liable for the negligence of his independent contractor, not his own personal fault. Admittedly the same
result is reached, but this illustrates the problems that exist in formulating the
proper issues and having the jury instructed accordingly.
This problem is further pointed out in Evans. It was ruled that the relationship of employer-independent contractor existed as a matter of law;
however the issue of the independent contractor's negligence was not submitted to the jury. After holding that it was error to instruct that the
employer had the burden to show that the work did not fall into the exceptions where the employer would not be liable, the court stated,
[W]e think it was error to instruct the jury on the relation of master
and servant, and the negligence which might be imputed to the de-
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so dangerous in relation to the particular circumstances as to be
ultrahazardous in nature, the plaintiff may also seek to hold the
defendant-employer absolutely liable regardless of fault.3
It can be safely concluded that in North Carolina a plaintiff will
recover from the employer of an independent contractor who is
under any of the nondelegable duties enumerated in the preceding
discussion. However, the determination of this question does not
necessarily determine .the issue of who-the employer or the independent contractor-will ultimately bear the financial burden of
the plaintiff's judgment.
C. RALPH KINSEY, JR.
Torts-Successive Automobile Collisions-Joint and
Several Liability
That joint tort-feasors are jointly and severally liable for the
injuries caused by their negligence and can be joined in the same
action by the injured party is a basic principle of law accepted by
most jurisdictions.2 Generally, joint tort-feasors are persons who
fendant on that theory, and upon the principle of agency or respondeat
superior, a relation which as the evidence now stands did not exist.
Id. at 261, 17 S.E.2d at 130. The writer is not certain of the ramifications of
this language and recognizes that any attempted explanation is conjectural.
However, one possible explanation may be that the plaintiff failed to formulate the issue with respect to the negligence of the independent contractor.
This is based on the following language used by the court: "The contractor
may, of course, be liable for the same want of due care in not taking the
necessary precautions, for the omission of which the employer becomes
liable...." Id. at 259, 17 S.E.2d at 129.

"'There should be no problem. in joining this cause of action with that
for negligence under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-123 (1953). The plaintiff may
be presented with the problem of election of remedies. However, these alternative theories do not appear to be inconsistent, and it is submitted that
the plaintiff should be allowed to have them submitted to the jury as alternative, provided, of course, the evidence in the case warrants it. See
Brandis, Civil Procedure (Pleadings and Parties), 43 N.C.L. REv. 871, 877
(1965); Brandis, Recent Developments in the Field of Permissive Joinder
of Parties and Causes in North Carolina, 34 N.C.L. REv. 405 (1956);
Brandis, Permissive Joinder of Parties and Causes in North Carolina, 25
N.C.L. REv. 1 (1946); Civil Procedure, Eleventh Annual Survey of N.C.
Case Law, 42 N.C.L. REv. 600, 612 (1964); Civil Procedure,Ninth,Annual
Survey of N.C. Case Law, 40 N.C.L. REV. 482, 491 (1962); Note, 13 N.C.L.
Ray. 226 (1935). In federal practice the plaintiff would be able to join
both claims for relief and would not be put to an election of remedies.
FED. R. Cxv. P. 8(e) (2).
'See, e.g., Harward v. General Motors Corp., 89 F.Supp. 170 (E.D.N.C.
1950); White v. Carolina Realty Co., 182 N.C. 536, 109 S.E. 564 (1921).
'See,

e.g., Phoenix Ins. Co. v. The Atlas, 93 U.S. 302 (1876); Van

